"* It is now routine to formulate coherent and quite general models for cross-sectional data having two levels (e.g., students within schools), three levels (students within classrooms and schools), longitudinal panel models, longitudinal models for students nested within social settings, and cross-classified models for cross-sectional data (e.g., students nested within neighborhood-by-school cells) or for longitudinal data (e.g., students migrating across social contexts such as classrooms). "* Efficient estimation procedures are now readily available and rapidly becoming computationally fast for each of the designs mentioned above, allowing for covariates at each level having fixed or random effects and unbalanced designs. "* Significant changes in streams of inquiry parallel-and are facilitated by--changes in modeling perspective. Rather than looking at schools as adding a constant to each student's knowledge, schools are viewed as modifying the entire social distribution of outcomes within them (e.g., Lee & Bryk, 1989) , consistent with the best thinking in sociology of education (e.g., Bidwell & Kasarda, 1980; Barr & Dreeben, 1983) . School effects are increasingly conceptualized as effects on learning rates rather than on status, as evidenced by the planned Early Childhood Longitudinal Study sponsored by the National Center for Education Statistics. * When the data are hierarchical, naive applications of marginal independence models (models assuming independence given only the fixed effects), which previously enjoyed a near monopoly, are no longer acceptable in the minds of journal reviewers in education, psychology, sociology, and allied fields. These reviewers now assume, as did Burstein in 1980, that we can do better. Now, in fact, we can.
The three articles before us can be only be appreciated or even understood in the context of the sea change described above. Rapid change must provoke critical reexamination. A novel approach can quickly become the new orthodoxy, drowning the critical spirit that produced it. It is a mark of the maturity of the multilevel movement that this time has come, and the spirit of reexamination is served well by the articles in this special issue. It is our loss that Leigh Burstein's untimely death has prevented his seeing this special issue and sharing his insights on it.
Statistical Inference and Scientific Judgment: A Response to Draper
We are indebted to David Draper for stimulating a needed discussion about the logical basis for statistical and scientific inference in social science. The topic of hierarchical models (HMs) serves as the occasion for this broader discussion; his criticism of particular applications using HMs could apply equally to any number of nonrandomized studies using convenience samples, regardless of analytic technique.
Methodologists differ in their beliefs about the requisite conditions for valid statistical inference. There are strict constructionists, who view statistical inference as meaningful only when a probability sample has been selected from a well-defined population. A second, broader perspective is that any collection of data is a sample from some population, and that, although the target population for inference remains tentative, statistical inference is useful. A third, Bayesian perspective views probability as subjective uncertainty about the process that produces data rather than relative frequency in a population. The notion of exchangeability (de Finetti, 1964 ) is often functionally equivalent to assuming the data arise from a simple random sample. The advantage is that exchangeability lays the basis for rational decision making under uncertainty even when no formal sampling mechanism is involved. In the Bayesian view, conclusions from empirical research combine new data with prior information to produce a new synthesis. If we adopt the essence of the Bayesian learning model in forming scientific judgments, we find that when the design of the study is weak, we must lean more heavily on prior information, including, for example, the stream of research of which the latest study is only one part. This learning model avoids unproductive dichoto-Raudenbush mies (a scientific inference either is or is not justified), leaving a role for degrees of belief and scientific judgment.
Although Draper describes three levels of inference, when the rubber hits the road, he's a strict constructionist. Because Huttenlocher et al.'s (1991) study involves a convenience sample of mother-infant pairs and because random assignment of mothers to speech conditions was not employed, Draper writes, "I find no scientific meaning in the parameter estimates and SEs Huttenlocher et al. report." Elsewhere, he makes clear that he expects uncertainty about scientific conclusions to be quantified by a confidence interval (he criticizes a classroom study for failing to modify a confidence interval to reflect "uncertainty about the validity of causal inferences").
Although my own applications of hierarchical models and those of Anthony Bryk have mostly involved probability samples from well-defined populations, we both tend to be broad constructionists. To me, a statement that two groups "differ significantly" (p < a) is a statement about the probability of obtaining a difference of a given magnitude between two groups randomly sampled from the same population. The statement that two groups "differ significantly" never by itself implies that this difference generalizes to a defined population, nor, contrary to Draper's assertion, should the finding of a statistically significant difference between groups by itself imply the existence of a causal relationship. A small p value or a short confidence interval (a statistical inference) can only supply one piece of evidence in favor of a particular scientific inference. Random sampling and random assignment strengthen the case. However, I believe there are many examples in educational work where intensive investigation of teaching and learning processes, even though based on convenience samples, has substantial scientific merit. Given limited resources for research, there is often a trade-off between a concern for nationally representative sampling and the concern for intensive measurement. It is too facile to say that sampling is always primary in science.
Statisticians like to think that causal inference and causal generalization can usually or should always be based on methodological grounds alone. I doubt, however, that science works this way most of the time. Rather, causal assertions, such as the assertion that smoking causes lung cancer, likely require a case based on a web of evidence from a variety of sources interpreted in the light of the best available theory. In the case of smoking, evidence has accumulated over time: correlational evidence on humans; experimental evidence on animals; mechanistic evidence based, for example, on the lung tissues of smokers and nonsmokers. Over time, the burden of proof gradually shifted from the proponents to the skeptics of the assertion that smoking caused lung cancer. The skeptics could invent alternative theories for the elevated incidence of lung cancer among smokers, but their theories were less plausible and fit less well with the entire body of evidence (which was undoubtedly made up of individually flawed studies). The case in favor of the causal inference was more coherent theoretically and fit better with relevant streams of research.
To make an analogy with smoking and lung cancer, many of the best educational researchers are now doing research that is more like looking at lung tissue than like computing correlations between smoking and lung cancer or conducting smoking experiments on animals. When I raise with my colleagues in educational psychology the arguments Draper raises about the importance of representativeness (which I do frequently!), they often say that to study classes, kids, teachers, and processes in the depth they feel is necessary is difficult or impossible in a large probability sample.
In defense of my colleagues, I doubt if too many cell biologists take a random sample of lung cells from a nationally representative sample of citizens in order to study the mechanisms by which smoking putatively affects the probability of lung cancer. Yet, such mechanistic research has apparently been decisive in creating a consensus among experts about this causal linkage and its generalization.
We cannot wait for the perfect social science study that randomly selects subjects from a large and well-defined population and then randomly assigns subjects to treatments, employing valid measures to allow unquestionable and generalizable causal inferences. Such a vision is useful to promote better research practice, but not as a description of how social science or epidemiology has typically advanced or will typically advance (see Kuhn's [1962] discussion of the myth of the single decisive study). To adopt such rigid expectations will inevitably lead to discounting the value of each individual study, undermining the possibility of recognizing contributions of streams of necessarily imperfect social research.
Let us apply the broad constructionist view to the Huttenlocher et al. (1991) study. Although Draper, a statistician, "finds no scientific meaning" in the relationship between maternal speech and acceleration of language development found in this study, Huttenlocher, a developmental psychologist intimately familiar with theory and prior research in the area, does find scientific meaning, as do the reviewers of Developmental Psychology. Draper criticizes the study for failing to control nonverbal communication, but Huttenlocher and the reviewers apparently find no prior theory or evidence that such nonverbal communication is related to vocabulary development, and perhaps, given the small size of the sample, worry about overfitting the model. Draper sees as too unqualified Huttenlocher et al.'s assertion that "The present study provides the first direct evidence that amount of exposure [to maternal speech] is important to vocabulary growth"; he is perhaps concerned about the use of the word "important." In contrast, Huttenlocher et al. emphasize the word "first" in that sentence (Bryk, personal communication); they know that it will take a number of replication studies on diverse samples to strengthen confidence in its generalizability. Although I admittedly have adopted the voice of the scientist in this dialogue with the statistician (how else would that voice be heard here?), I view the dialogue as useful. Textbook discussions of design do not end scientific disputes.
Choice of model (HM versus other) is orthogonal to one's stance as a strict versus broad constructionist; whatever the stance, one might love or hate HMs for a given study. The utility of HMs to summarize evidence in the "Cognitive Strategies in Writing" example depends on their capacity to produce a more precise estimate of an adjusted mean difference (than would be found in an aggregated analysis) with an honest confidence interval (as compared to a conventional student-level analysis assuming marginal independence). Whether such a statistical inference should be interpreted causally depends on scientific judgment which must be informed by an elaborate set of analyses and substantive considerations that have little to do with the modeling issues at hand in chapter 5 of Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) . To set the record straight, no causal inference was made in the original exposition: A statement that one group of children scored higher than another is not a causal inference; such an inference requires an explanation of the observed difference between the two groups and not merely a recognition of its existence.
I I wish, however, that the article had clarified the final sentence in the abstract. Even if the researcher is interested only in the fixed regression coefficients of studies having two-level designs with large groups and small intraclass correlations (a setting that seems exceptional in educational research), it is not clear to me which "traditional techniques perform as well or better" than "multilevel models." In fact, the comparison of "traditional techniques" and "multilevel models" seems to violate the useful distinction between choice of model and choice of method of estimation. I trust that by elaborating on this concern I will not conceal my overriding applause for the article.
Under It is well-known that restricted maximum likelihood (REML), the method of estimation used in HLM, duplicates the standard mixed-model ANOVA results for the classical balanced experimental designs. Raudenbush (1993b) shows equivalence in the case of one-way random effects, the two-factor mixed hierarchical design (e.g., students within classes within treatments), randomized blocks design (with repeated measures on students or longitudinal panel models as a special case), and the mixed model for two-way crossclassification (e.g., children within treatments implemented at each of many day-care centers). The article shows how estimates and exact t or F tests for fixed effects and variance parameters can be recovered from the HLM output. Canonical examples are those simple data sets in the chapters of Kirk (1982) corresponding to these research designs. Complete raw data, classical ANOVA results, and HLM results are presented with detailed specification of how to reproduce the classical results using the more general approach. Similarly, the three-level model allows analysis for the three-factor hierarchical design and several more complex split-plot designs (e.g., persons changing over time and nested within classrooms that are, in turn, nested within treatments).
Reexamining and Improving Application
Crossed random effects models (e.g., Raudenbush, 1993a) map to a variety of designs having cross-classified random factors. Goldstein (1987) has shown how HMs can duplicate standard multivariate results.
Thus, HMs based on REML duplicate the familiar balanced data results for the classical designs while facilitating generalization to the more complex data characteristic of educational field research having unbalanced designs, covariates at each level (e.g., time-varying predictors), and continuous and discrete responses. These models therefore combine the virtues of the experimental design literature (which emphasizes the need to understand sources of variation in data and how these sources affect inference) with the key virtue of the general linear model (flexibility in incorporating continuous and discrete covariates in linear models).
Features of Rogosa and Saner's article that I found most valuable included an emphasis on description, graphical display, and model checking using simple diagnostics. Although these have been underemphasized in many methodological discussions, the HLM program includes a residual file that can be used for a variety of model-checking and data exploration procedures described in detail in chapter 9 of Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) and in the current HLM manual (which uses data from High School and Beyond rather than the "rat data"). Included in this file are least squares equations for each unit having full-rank data and empirical Bayes equations for all units. Rogosa and Saner's emphasis on better uncertainty estimation for variance components and random effects is also well placed. Large-sample standard errors based on the information matrix are least useful when such estimates are most needed-when the number of higher-level units is small. The bootstrap as implemented in Timepath appears to be an attractive alternative for balanced data. However, for unbalanced designs, resampling must be multilevel and is computer-intensive (Laird & Louis, 1987; see Bagakas, 1992 , and Raudenbush & Willms, in press, for educational applications). Bayes estimation via Gibbs sampling (e.g., Seltzer, 1993) provides posterior distributions for parameters and functions thereof. However, the approach imposes new assumptions in the form of prior distributions, which may not be friendly to Rogosa and Saner's perspective.
There are many specific issues raised in Rogosa and Saner's article to which I could respond in detail.2 Conditional reliability estimates and correlations between random effects, for example, have clear meanings (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 1985, p. 66 , with application to studies of school differences controlling demographic background). Space limitations forbid such a detailed response. It seems more useful in any case to focus in the future on the useful issues Rogosa and Saner raise concerning description, model checking, and uncertainty estimation for variance-covariance components. In pursuing these, simulations and model comparisons are likely to be most useful when the data are unbalanced and the number of higher-level units small.
Morris's Overview
Carl Morris has made seminal contributions to the theory of hierarchical models and his comments on applications of these models in education are most helpful. While I agree entirely with his recommendations, I offer a few qualifying remarks designed to discourage readers from overgeneralizing his criticism of maximum likelihood (ML).
Morris correctly points out that when the number of Level 2 units, k, is small, inferences about individual effects, 0i, and Level 2 regression coefficients, 3, conditional on ML point estimates of the Level 2 variance, T"2, can be misleading. He reanalyzes data from Raudenbush and Bryk (1985) A final word on software: Knowing that the HLM software had been thoroughly evaluated in simulation studies by Bassiri (1988) and Fotiu (1989) , and having been involved in extensively checking HLM3.0, I was concerned to read about Morris's experience with HLM3.0. An inquiry with Scientific Software (SSI) revealed that the errors he described were introduced when SSI ported HLM3.0 to the Sun Workstation. Flawed versions of HLM were distributed to four Sun users, all of whom were subsequently sent HLM3.01, which corrected the flaw. The much more widely used PC version was not affected. This experience reinforces Morris's recommendations for the most painstaking and extensive testing of software even after seemingly minor modifications. I apologize to him and anyone else inconvenienced by this error.
Notes
'Fisher scoring can be shown to be mathematically equivalent to iterative generalized least squares (IGLS) in the case of normal data and normal random effects (Raudenbush, 1994) . 2For example, Rogosa has claimed for years to have an early version of HLM that produced "wild results," but, despite repeated attempts at correspondence, I have not been able to obtain this version of the program or the data he analyzed. Nor have their been any data-destroying fires or reported fires in the Raudenbush or Bryk residences. 3These likelihoods are equivilant to posteriors if 72 is a priori uniform on the nonnegative real line.
